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Abstract
Traded good prices affect the real exchange rate first through their effect on the overall
price level and second through their effect on the nominal exchange rate. Whereas the price
level effect, which is positive in sign, is universally recognized, the nominal exchange rate
effect, which is negative in sign, is routinely ignored. We calculate to which extent real ex-
change rate changes are accounted for by traded good prices and other components of the
real exchange rate. We find that the nominal exchange rate effect neutralizes the price level
effect entirely, suggesting that, contrary to popular belief, good market arbitrage is not con-
ducive to purchasing power parity (the purchasing power parity fallacy). Rather than traded
or non-traded good prices, the main driving force behind the real exchange rate is currency
market pressure, a variable that, as we argue, is largely determined by the cumulative trade
and capital flows of a country.
JEL classification: F31
Keywords: Real exchange rate accounting; good market arbitrage; purchasing power parity fallacy;
currency market pressure
1 Introduction
The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of two countries’ price levels. It is tempting to think
that the reversion of the real exchange rate to its long-run mean is mainly a matter of convergence
of international traded good prices. However, traded good price movements have two effects of
opposite sign on the real exchange rate. A rise in domestic traded good prices, for instance, leads to
a real appreciation (as a result of the rise of the domestic price level) as well as a real depreciation
(due to the nominal depreciation caused by the fall in the domestic currency’s purchasing power).
The second effect can potentially offset the first one, especially when the nominal exchange rate
is flexible. However, it plays no role in the theory of purchasing power parity (PPP), which is why
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we regard that theory as fallacious. What this paper shows is that what drives the real exchange
rate is mostly currency market pressure, not traded or non-traded good prices.
It is all too easy to fall victim to the PPP fallacy. To see why, consider the standard argument
that economists put forward to explain why the real exchange rate should revert to a value near one,
provided there are no transport costs or differences in non-traded good prices across countries. If
traded good prices are lower at home than abroad, an arbitrage opportunity arises which will raise
the demand for domestic goods and lower that for foreign goods. The subsequent rise in the prices
of traded goods at home and fall in the prices of traded goods abroad will then restore PPP.
This reasoning is put forward in every textbook on international economics, yet it also under-
lies much of the academic research on PPP. What it does not take into account, however, is that
the rise in domestic traded good prices leads to a fall in the purchasing power of the domestic
currency, and vice versa abroad, such that there is a force at work that makes the real exchange
rate move away from its long-run mean. Whether the price level effect (which favours PPP con-
vergence) or the exchange rate effect (which favours PPP divergence) dominates is the empirical
question which this paper seeks to answer.
To challenge the conventional understanding of real exchange rates, we rely on a technical
innovation, namely a new method for measuring the contribution of several time series to their
sum. In the literature initiated by Engel (1999), sample statistics such as the mean, the variance,
the covariance and the mean squared error are used to measure the contribution of (at most) two
components of the real exchange rate to changes in that variable. Our approach is much simpler:
If the real exchange rate rises, say, by 10 units and one of its summands by 7, then we say that this
summand contributes 70% to the movement of the real exchange rate. If the summand rises by 13
units, then we say that it contributes 130% to the movement of the real exchange rate. And if, as a
final example, it falls by 3 units, then we actually speak of a deduction of 30% from the movement
of the real exchange rate. We like our procedure because it is arguably the most simple, exact
and intuitive. What is more, it allows us to measure the contribution of more than two component
series to the real exchange rate.
The central conclusion of this paper is that traded good price changes account for practically
none of the real exchange rate movements that we observe across countries. Instead, the main
driving force behind real exchange rates is what we define as currency market pressure, namely
the part of the nominal exchange rate that is not explained by traded good price differences. So
the natural question arises of what it is that determines currency market pressure. We address this
question in a theoretical section, in which we argue that changes in currency market pressure are
largely determined by real interest changes, the current account balance, net capital inflows (that
is, net outflows of non-monetary, non-reserve financial assets), net sales of official reserves by the
domestic central bank and net purchases of the domestic currency by foreign central banks.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains a review of the relevant literature. Sec-
tion 3 introduces and defines two contribution measures proposed by us, namely the unbounded
contribution measure (UCM) and the bounded contribution measure (BCM), and explains why we
choose to work with the former. Section 4 measures the contributions of traded good inflation
and currency market pressure to nominal exchange rate movements. Section 5 uses real exchange
2
rate accounting to show empirically that traded good arbitrage is a not a suitable mechanism to
bring about purchasing power parity, thereby demonstrating the purchasing power parity fallacy.
Section 6 offers further reflections on the concept of currency market pressure, the variable that is
found to account for most of the movements of the real exchange rate. Finally, Section 7 provides
conclusions.
2 Literature review
Our study is related to two different research areas in the economic literature on exchange rates.
Work in the first research area was spurred by Engel (1999) who showed empirically that the ratio
of non-traded to traded good prices accounts for almost none of US real exchange rate changes.
Engel’s finding stands in stark contrast to theories that explain real exchange rate movements
through the relative price of non-traded goods. Contributions to this research area include Betts
and Kehoe (2006, 2008), Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2006), Chen, Choi and Devereux
(2006), Drozd and Nosal (2010) and Bache, Sveen and Torstensen (2013). For a detailed discus-
sion of the methodological approaches and empirical results, the reader is referred to Sections 3
and 5.4 and Appendix A. This literature is of interest to us since it deals with the question of how
different components of the real exchange rate contribute to real exchange rate movements. How-
ever, our interest is to gauge the capacity of traded good price convergence to restore purchasing
power parity. Thus unlike the cited studies, whose focus is on the relative price of non-traded
goods, we concentrate on the contribution of traded good prices to real exchange rate movements.
The second research area addresses what has become known as the ”purchasing power parity
puzzle”. This puzzle refers to the finding that it is difficult to reconcile the enormous short-run
volatility of real exchange rates with their very slow convergence towards purchasing power parity
(Rogoff, 1996, Sarno and Taylor, 2002, Taylor and Taylor, 2004). Most authors attribute the
slow mean reversion of real exchange rates to the existence of transport costs that give rise to
”commodity points” delineating a region of no central tendency among relative prices (Obstfeld
and Taylor, 1997). Hence a large number of papers have tested whether PPP actually holds in the
medium or long run (Enders, 1988, Manzur and Ariff, 1995, Alexius and Nilsson, 2000, Vataja,
2000, Choi, Kapetanios and Shin, 2002, Ho and Ariff, 2011, Hall, Hondroyiannis, Kenjegaliev,
Swamy and Tavlas, 2013) and whether the PPP hypothesis can be used to forecast real exchange
rates (Ca’ Zorzi, Muck and Rubaszek, 2016, Cheung, Chinn, Garcı´a Pascual and Zhang, 2017).
Moreover, researchers have applied nonlinear time series models to data on real exchange rates
so as to determine the location of the commodity points as well as the adjustment speeds and
half-lives of deviations from purchasing power parity inside and outside the bands of no arbitrage
(Michael, Nobay and Peel, 1997, Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997, Baum, Barkoulas and Caglayan,
2001, Lo and Zivot, 2001, Taylor, Peel and Sarno, 2001, Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn and Rey, 2003,
2005, Paya, Venetis and Peel, 2003, Heimonen, 2006, Juvenal and Taylor, 2008, Nakagawa, 2010,
Yoon, 2010, Pavlidis, Paya and Peel, 2011, Woo, Lee and Chan, 2014). There have also been
several empirical refinements of the PPP hypothesis. Imbs et al. (2005), for instance, show that
slow mean reversion of the aggregate real exchange rate is consistent with much faster adjustment
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of disaggregated relative prices. All of these studies have added to our knowledge of the empirical
behaviour of real exchange rates. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that they are all based on
the belief that good market arbitrage and the law of one price are conducive to purchasing power
parity, a belief that is directly challenged in this paper.
What is overlooked not only in the cited papers, but in the literature on exchange rates in
general, is the fact that good market arbitrage does not only induce price adjustments, but also, as
a kind of knock-on effect, adjustments of the nominal exchange rate. The only studies we found
that are aware of the relevance of nominal exchange rate adjustments for the PPP hypothesis are
those by Engel and Morley (2001), Cheung, Lai and Bergman (2004) and Beckmann (2013).
These authors provide empirical evidence showing that the convergence of the nominal exchange
rate is slower than that of prices and use their findings to explain the slow convergence towards
PPP. What we point out, however, is that since nominal exchange rate movements are inversely
linked to price level changes through the nominal exchange rate equation (see Section 4), one
cannot treat nominal exchange rate convergence and price convergence separately.
To see this last point more clearly, suppose, for instance, that domestic traded good prices
are too low for PPP to hold. Then good market arbitrage would induce domestic traded good
prices to rise and foreign traded good prices to fall, providing a force to restore PPP. Yet since the
price changes affect most traded goods, the domestic traded good price level would rise and the
foreign traded good price level fall, inducing a nominal depreciation and therefore a movement
of the real exchange rate away from its long-run trend. As long as the nominal exchange rate is
allowed to float more or less freely, there are thus two countervailing forces, one provoking the
convergence towards PPP and the other one the divergence away from PPP. Which of these two
forces dominates is an empirical question, which to our knowledge has never been posed, let alone
answered.1
3 Choice of contribution measure
Let us now define formally the contribution measures proposed by us—namely the unbounded
contribution measure (UCM) and the bounded contribution measure (BCM)—and explore their
usefulness. A detailed comparison with alternative contribution measures used in the literature is
provided in Appendix A.
Suppose you have a variable xt that is the sum of the variables x1,t, x2,t, . . . , xk,t:
xt =
k∑
i=1
xi,t. (1)
1The only exception is the study by Eleftheriou and Mu¨ller-Plantenberg (2017), who run nonparametric regressions
on various data sets to examine how the real exchange rate, the price differential and the nominal exchange rate react to
an overvalued real exchange rate over time. In line with the hypothesis of this paper, their results show that when price
adjustment is fast (which it is for traded good real exchange rate data), the nominal exchange rate tends to diverge in
response to deviations from purchasing power parity.
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Then the unbounded contribution measure quantifies how much the movements of xi,t, i =
1, 2, . . . , k, account for those of xt:
UCM(xi,t, xt) =
T∑
t=h+1
|∆hxt|∑T
τ=h+1 |∆hxτ |
× ∆hxi,t
∆hxt
, (2)
where ∆h = 1− Lh and L is the lag operator.
Note the following very useful properties of the unbounded contribution measure:
UCM(xi,t + xj,t, xt) = UCM(xi,t, xt) + UCM(xj,t, xt), (3)
UCM(axi,t, xt) = UCM
(
xi,t,
1
a
xt
)
= aUCM(xi,t, xt), (4)
k∑
i=1
UCM(xi,t, xt) = 1. (5)
One could also consider the bounded contribution measure:
BCM(xi,t, xt) =
T∑
t=h+1
|∆hxt|∑T
τ=h+1 |∆hxτ |
×max
[
min
(
∆hxi,t
∆hxt
, 1
)
, 0
]
. (6)
When 0 < xi,t/xt < 1, the unbounded and bounded contribution measure take the same values.
When xi,t/xt > 1, the contribution of the component series xi,t to the composite series xt is more
than a hundred percent, which is why the bounded contribution measure takes the value of one.
When xi,t/xt < 0, the component series xi,t takes the sign that is opposite to that of the composite
series xt, implying a deduction of xi,t from xt rather than a contribution. This is why in this case
the bounded contribution measure takes the value of zero.
As long as k = 2, the bounded contribution measure has similar properties as the unbounded
one:
BCM(x1,t + x2,t, xt) = BCM(x1,t, xt) + BCM(x2,t, xt), (7)
2∑
i=1
BCM(xi,t, xt) = 1. (8)
If, however, k > 2, the properties in Equations 7 and 8 do not hold any longer in general.
This paper uses the unbounded contribution measure for the exchange rate decompositions,
first because of its homogeneity of degree one (see Equation 4) and because of the very convenient
way that composite variables with more than two components can be studied.
4 Nominal exchange rate accounting
In this paper, we decompose the nominal exchange rate into two components. We shall call these
two components, respectively, the ”nominal exchange rate anchor” and ”currency market pres-
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sure”. The purpose of this decomposition is to enable us to measure how much traded good prices
impact on the real exchange rate through their effect on the nominal exchange rate (see Section 5).
It should be noted that in this and the following sections, we employ quarterly price data
from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators, using prices from the category food (excluding res-
taurants) as a proxy for traded good prices and prices from the category construction as a proxy
for non-traded good prices. We calculate bilateral nominal exchange rates from the US dollar
exchange rates of the individual countries. Real exchange rates are constructed on the basis of dif-
ferent hypothetical shares of non-traded goods, α, namely 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75. More information
on the country coverage and the length of the time series can be found in Appendix B.1.
To illustrate the unbounded contribution measure (UCM) for the components of nominal and
real exchange rates, we use box plots that represent the distributions of the UCM of all available
country pairs for horizons ranging from 1 quarter to 30 years. On each box, the central mark is
the median, the edges of the box are the 25th and 75th percentiles, the whiskers extend to the most
extreme data points not considered outliers, and outliers are plotted individually. Points are drawn
as outliers if they are larger than q3 +w(q3–q1) or smaller than q1–w(q3–q1), where q1 and q3 are
the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively, and w = 1.5 (Matlab’s default value corresponding to
approximately +/–2.7σ and 99.3% coverage if the data are normally distributed).
4.1 The nominal exchange rate anchor
Most economists would agree that the nominal exchange rate should, at least in the long run, revert
to a value that ensures that traded goods cost the same everywhere, provided one compares their
prices in the same currency. If the comparison is made in the domestic currency, it should hold
that
pT,Ht = −st + pT,Ft , (9)
where st is the nominal exchange rate of the home country vis-a`-vis the foreign country (defined as
the foreign-currency price of the domestic currency) and pT,Ht and p
T,F
t are, respectively, the price
levels of traded goods at home and abroad. (Note that all exchange rates and prices are expressed
as logarithms in this paper.)
For suppose that traded goods are denominated in the domestic currency at home and in the
foreign currency abroad. Then a violation of Equation 9 would imply that the currencies’ pur-
chasing powers in terms of the same traded goods would differ, a situation that would induce the
weaker currency to gain and the stronger currency to lose value.
Since in this paper international price differentials play an important role, we adopt the sim-
plified notation shown in Tables 1 and 2. The nominal exchange rate anchor can thus be written
as:
s anchort = −pTt = −(pT,Ht − pT,Ft ). (10)
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Variable Definition Description
pTt p
T,H
t − pT,Ft Difference between domestic and foreign traded
good prices
pNt p
N,H
t − pN,Ft Difference between domestic and foreign non-traded
good prices
pt p
H
t − pFt
= (1− α)pTt + αpNt
Difference between domestic and foreign overall
price levels
pNt − pTt (pN,Ht −pT,Ht )−(pN,Ft −pT,Ft ) Difference between domestic and foreign differences
between non-traded and traded good prices
pTt − pt (pT,Ht − pHt )− (pT,Ft − pFt )
= −α(pNt − pTt )
Difference between domestic and foreign differences
between traded good prices and the overall price
level (equal to minus α times the difference between
domestic and foreign differences between non-traded
and traded good prices)
pNt − pt (pN,Ht − pHt )− (pN,Ft − pFt )
= (1− α)(pNt − pTt )
Difference between domestic and foreign differences
between non-traded good prices and the overall price
level (equal to one minus α times the difference
between domestic and foreign differences between
non-traded and traded good prices)
Table 1: Notation for price differentials. The parameter α stands for the share of non-traded
goods in the overall price level. The superscript T stands for traded goods, the
superscript N for non-traded goods, the superscript H for the home country and the
superscript F for the foreign country. Note that prices are expressed as logarithms.
The idea that the nominal exchange rate is inversely proportional to the price level differential
is an old one and, for instance, forms the basis of the monetary model of exchange rate determina-
tion. The reason the traded good price differential, rather than the overall price level differential, is
chosen for the calculation of the PPP-consistent value of the nominal exchange rate is that foreign
exchange traders will mostly rely on traded goods, which are available everywhere, in order to
determine and compare the purchasing powers of different currencies.
4.2 Currency market pressure
Often, especially in the short and medium run, yet possibly even in the long run, the nominal
exchange rate will differ from the value indicated by the traded good price differential, pTt . Or in
other words, the traded good real exchange rate—which we define as the real exchange rate based
on traded good prices, or as qTt = st + p
T
t—will not be equal to zero. Now we define currency
market pressure, or s˜t, to be the difference between the nominal exchange rate, st, and the nominal
exchange rate anchor, s anchort :
s˜t = st − s anchort = st − (−pTt ) = st + pTt . (11)
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Variable Definition Description
st Nominal exchange rate (price of the domestic
currency in terms of the foreign currency)
s anchort −pTt Nominal exchange rate anchor (nominal exchange
rate that is consistent with PPP for traded goods)
s˜t st − s anchort Currency market pressure (difference between actual
and PPP-consistent nominal exchange rate)
s˜ coret s˜t − s˜ inflation-offsettingt Core currency market pressure (part of currency
market pressure that is unrelated to official
intervention used to offset the effect of price level
changes on the nominal exchange rate)
s˜ infl.-offs.t γp
T
t , where γ is chosen so
that UCM(pTt , s˜
core
t ) = 0
Inflation-offsetting currency market pressure (part of
currency market pressure resulting from official
intervention used to offset the effect of price level
changes on the nominal exchange rate)
qt st + pt Real exchange rate (difference between domestic and
foreign overall price levels, when both are expressed
in the same currency)
qTt st + p
T
t Traded good real exchange rate (difference between
domestic and foreign traded good prices, when both
are expressed in the same currency)
Table 2: Notation for currency market pressure and exchange rates. The superscript T stands
for traded goods. Note that exchange rates and prices are expressed as logarithms.
One may think of currency market pressure, s˜t, as the excess demand for the domestic currency
in the foreign exchange market that arises due to trade and capital flows as well as the official
intervention by central banks. Section 6 elaborates in more detail on how currency market pressure
could be interpreted in economic terms.
4.3 Nominal exchange rate accounting
As explained above, the nominal exchange rate can be decomposed as follows (decomposition 1):
st = x1,t + x2,t, (12)
where
x1,t = s
anchor
t = −pTt ,
x2,t = s˜t.
Figure 1 reveals to what extent the traded good price differential and currency market pressure
account for changes in nominal exchange rates. The results are as expected. Here we concentrate
on the medians of the distributions shown in Figure 1. At horizons of up to one year, traded good
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(b) Currency market pressure (s˜t)
Figure 1: Nominal exchange rate accounting: traded good prices and currency market
pressure. The nominal exchange rate accounting is based on the decomposition 1 in
Equation 12, using the food and construction price data set (see Appendix B.1).
prices account for only a tiny fraction of nominal exchange rate movements. The contribution of
traded good prices then rises almost monotonically as the horizons considered become longer. At
horizons of 15 years or more, traded good prices account for almost exactly 100 percent of nominal
exchange rate changes. Since UCM(s˜t, st) = 1 − UCM(−pTt , st), currency market pressure is
an all-important determinant of the nominal exchange rate at short horizons, yet has on average
almost no effect on nominal exchange rates in the long run.
5 Real exchange rate accounting
We now turn to real exchange rate accounting. In this paper, the real exchange rate is defined as:
qt = st + (1− α)pTt + αpNt . (13)
Real exchange rates can be calculated for one good (for example, the Big Mac index) or for baskets
of goods (for example, the CPI-based real exchange rate). Here we are interested in the relative
contribution of traded and non-traded good prices to real exchange rate movements. Engel (1999)
used real exchange rates based on baskets of goods for his analysis and tried to divide those baskets
into sub-baskets containing either traded or non-traded goods. The problem with this approach is
that the sub-baskets contain to a great extent categories that have both large traded and non-traded
components. This carries the risk of underestimating the difference between traded and non-traded
good prices.
Our approach consists instead in looking at only two categories of goods, food and construc-
tion, where the price level of the first category is a proxy for traded good prices and the price level
of the second category a proxy for non-traded good prices. Apart from getting cleaner measures
of the prices of both types of goods, there is also a practical advantage. Just as other contribution
measures, the UCM is not very stable when one compares different country pairs and horizons, h.
It is therefore important to consider many country pairs in order to be able to discern patterns for
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the quartiles of the contribution measures. By looking at only two good categories, we are able to
obtain comparable data for 16 countries, giving us a total of 120 country pairs.
5.1 Core versus inflation-offsetting currency market pressure
The aim of this section is to determine how much traded good prices and currency market pressure
contribute to real exchange rate movements. It is important to note that traded good prices affect
the exchange rate through three channels: first, through their effect on the overall price level,
(1−α)pTt +αpNt ; second, through their effect on the nominal exchange rate anchor, s anchort = −pTt ;
and third, through their effect on currency market pressure, s˜t. This last effect is empirically
important as it is common for countries to offset exchange rate changes brought about by changes
in the traded good price differential, pTt , through official intervention.
Suppose, for instance, that a country wants to fix the exchange rate by raising currency market
pressure in response to a rise in the traded good price differential, pTt . Since this change in currency
market pressure is directly related to changes in pTt , we will refer to it as ”inflation-offsetting”
currency market pressure and denote it as s˜ inflation-offsetting. Inflation-offsetting currency market
pressure must be distinguished from ”core” currency market pressure, s˜ coret , which on average is
not influenced by the movements of the traded good price differential.
Formally, core and inflation-offsetting currency market pressure are defined by the following
two equations:
s˜ coret = s˜− s˜ inflation-offsettingt , (14)
s˜
inflation-offsetting
t = γp
T
t , (15)
where γ is a parameter that is chosen in such a way that UCM(pTt , s˜
core) = 0. Appendix C shows
how γ, which is normally positive, can be estimated through a grid search to any desired degree
of accuracy.
Note that γ, which measures the proportion of traded good price changes offset by official
intervention, will normally differ depending on the country pair and the horizon considered. The
more a country is committed to stabilizing its exchange rate in the face of traded good price
fluctuations, the higher will be γ. However, if a country tries to neutralize traded good price
movements, say, in the short term but not in the long term, this will be reflected by higher values
of γ at short horizons and lower values of γ at long horizons.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of γ for all our country pairs at different horizons. Panel a of
Figure 2 uses the OECD’s food price index to proxy for traded good prices. It shows that most
countries act in a way that implies a value of γ near one at short horizons and a value of γ near
zero at very long horizons. (Note that Panel b of Figure 2 is based on an alternative data set, which
will be discussed in Section 5.3.)
The total contribution of traded good prices to the real exchange rate with its three components
can thus be measured by:
UCM([(1− α)pTt ] + [−pTt ] + [γpTt ], qTt )
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Figure 2: Inflation-offsetting currency market pressure. The figures show box plots of the
proportion of traded good price changes offset by official intervention, γ, at different
horizons. A value of one implies that the central bank uses official intervention so as to
suppress the effect of traded good prices on the nominal exchange rate, whereas a value
of zero indicates that the central bank stays passive. The box plot in Panel a is based on
the food and construction price data set (see Appendix B.1) and the box plot in Panel b
on the PPI and CPI data set (see Appendix B.2).
= UCM([(1− α)− (1− γ)]pTt , qTt ) (16)
= UCM((γ − α)pTt , qTt ).
In this paper, we refer to (1 − α) as the ”price level effect” of traded good prices on the real
exchange rate and to −(1 − γ) as the ”nominal exchange rate effect”. Note that the latter effect
measures the combined effects of traded good prices on the nominal exchange rate anchor, s anchort ,
which is negative, and on the inflation-offsetting currency market pressure, s˜ inflation-offsettingt , which
in general is positive, but smaller.
5.2 The purchasing power parity fallacy
5.2.1 Contribution of traded good prices to real exchange rate changes
We are now in a position to decompose the real exchange rate as follows (decomposition 2):
qt = x1,t + x2,t + x3,t, (17)
where
x1,t = s˜
core
t ,
x2,t = (γ − α)pTt ,
x3,t = αp
N
t .
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good prices (αpNt ), α = 0.25
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(d) Core currency market pressure
(s˜ coret ), α = 0.50
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(e) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign traded good
prices ((γ − α)pTt), α = 0.50
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(f) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign non-traded
good prices (αpNt ), α = 0.50
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(g) Core currency market pressure
(s˜ coret ), α = 0.75
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(h) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign traded good
prices ((γ − α)pTt), α = 0.75
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(i) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign non-traded
good prices (αpNt ), α = 0.75
Figure 3: Real exchange rate accounting: core currency market pressure, traded good
prices and nontraded good prices. The real exchange rate accounting is based on the
decomposition 2 in Equation 17, using the food and construction price data set (see
Appendix B.1). Note that the low values of UCM((γ − α)pTt , qt) show that, contrary to
common belief, traded good price adjustments account for almost none of the
movements of the real exchange rate (the PPP fallacy).
The results, which are shown in Figure 3 and Table 3, are striking for two reasons. The first is
that core currency market pressure, s˜ coret , is responsible for most of the real exchange rate changes.
This is true for all horizons, from 1 quarter to 30 years. Besides, the variability of the UCM is
rather small, adding confidence to this finding. For most of the horizons, the median UCM of core
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Horizon s˜ coret (γ − α)pTt αpNt
α =
0.25
α =
0.50
α =
0.75
α =
0.25
α =
0.50
α =
0.75
α =
0.25
α =
0.50
α =
0.75
0.25 84.4% 86.7% 86.0% 12.9% 6.8% 2.1% 3.0% 8.3% 15.9%
0.50 86.4% 89.2% 88.6% 10.3% 4.3% 0.7% 4.4% 8.4% 13.5%
0.75 89.0% 90.9% 88.1% 6.7% 1.7% -0.0% 4.2% 10.5% 19.1%
1 90.1% 89.9% 86.7% 4.9% 0.2% -0.2% 5.5% 12.3% 19.7%
2 86.3% 85.2% 81.2% 3.2% -0.1% -0.6% 8.0% 16.6% 23.3%
3 89.0% 88.0% 83.6% 1.6% -0.7% -1.5% 9.1% 19.1% 24.8%
4 90.2% 89.5% 83.2% 0.7% -1.8% -2.5% 8.9% 18.8% 29.6%
5 90.4% 87.2% 79.6% 0.0% -1.7% -0.7% 11.5% 24.1% 36.4%
6 90.2% 85.6% 78.5% 0.5% -1.8% 0.7% 12.6% 24.8% 37.7%
7 87.3% 82.3% 73.6% 1.6% -3.5% -4.5% 14.7% 31.2% 44.2%
8 85.1% 80.0% 71.3% 0.3% -4.7% -2.1% 16.2% 32.0% 43.8%
9 81.4% 76.7% 68.3% 0.7% -1.7% -1.4% 9.1% 20.9% 38.5%
10 83.5% 74.0% 66.0% 5.1% -0.7% -3.6% 9.0% 27.5% 48.1%
15 73.4% 67.2% 59.0% 1.6% -3.0% -1.3% 21.7% 34.4% 65.0%
20 73.7% 71.5% 55.9% -0.6% -11.5% -1.9% 23.9% 45.6% 51.8%
25 55.2% 57.6% 44.1% 10.2% 5.1% 2.0% 21.9% 38.7% 56.4%
30 55.0% 40.4% 25.4% 5.2% -7.5% 0.4% 32.4% 63.2% 84.7%
Table 3: Real exchange rate accounting: core currency market pressure, traded good prices
and nontraded good prices. The real exchange rate accounting is based on the
decomposition 2 in Equation 17, using the food and construction price data set (see
Appendix B.1). Note that the low values of UCM((γ − α)pTt , qt) show that, contrary to
common belief, traded good price adjustments account for almost none of the
movements of the real exchange rate (the PPP fallacy).
currency market pressure is above 70 to 80%, and it is only at horizons of about 10 years or more
that the UCM falls to about one half.
The second reason is that the contribution of traded good prices to real exchange rate move-
ments is negligible. This indicates that the exchange rate effect more or less offsets the price level
effect. So rising domestic traded good prices, for instance, raise the overall price level at home yet
lead to a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency of about the same magnitude.
At horizons of less than a year, there seems to be at least a very low positive contribution
of traded good prices to real exchange rate changes, particularly if the share of traded goods,
1 − α, is high (that is, if α is low). This is probably due to the fact that γ is close to one at very
short horizons as central banks strive to keep the nominal exchange stable, with the result that the
exchange rate effect of traded good prices is close to zero.
In general, though, the plots in Figure 3 suggest that traded good prices practically do not
contribute to the movements of the real exchange rate, no matter the horizon considered. As a
consequence, it appears that good market arbitrage cannot be regarded as an effective mechanism
to restore purchasing power parity.
In Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, we present two more arguments against the PPP hypothesis.
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5.2.2 The deviation of traded good prices from the overall price level
Especially over the longer term, traded and non-traded good prices are mostly driven by overall
inflation, rather than by good market arbitrage. Overall inflation in turn is mainly linked to mon-
etary variables such as the money supply and aggregate income. One could therefore argue that
it is the difference between traded good prices and the overall price level, rather than traded good
prices themselves, that is driven by good market arbitrage. This is why we have also carried out
the real exchange rate accounting based on the following decomposition (decomposition 3):
qt = x1,t + x2,t + x3,t + x4,t, (18)
where
x1,t = s˜
core
t ,
x2,t = γpt,
x3,t = (γ − α)(pTt − pt),
x4,t = α(p
N
t − pt).
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(a) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign overall
price levels (γpt), α = 0.50
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(b) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign differences
between traded good prices and
the overall price level
((γ − α)(pTt − pt)), α = 0.50
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(c) Weighted difference of the
domestic and foreign differences
between the non-traded good
prices and the overall price level
(α(pNt − pt)), α = 0.50
Figure 4: Real exchange rate accounting: overall price level and traded and non-traded
good price differentials vis-a`-vis the overall price level. The real exchange rate
accounting is based on the decomposition 3 in Equation 18, using the food and
construction price data set (see Appendix B.1). Note that the low values of
UCM((γ − α)(pTt − pt), qt) show that, contrary to common belief, traded good price
adjustments account for almost none of the movements of the real exchange rate (the
PPP fallacy).
The results are shown in Figure 4 and Table 4. Again, most of the changes of the real ex-
change rate are accounted for by core currency market pressure, s˜ coret . Note that the distribution
of UCM(s˜ coret , qt) is identical to that of decomposition 2 and is plotted in Panels a, d and g of
Figure 3.
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Horizon γpt (γ − α)(pTt − pt) α(pNt − pt)
α =
0.25
α =
0.50
α =
0.75
α =
0.25
α =
0.50
α =
0.75
α =
0.25
α =
0.50
α =
0.75
0.25 15.6% 13.0% 13.8% 1.7% 0.7% -0.1% -1.9% -0.1% 1.1%
0.50 14.0% 10.8% 11.2% 1.1% 0.2% -0.1% -1.6% 0.1% 1.4%
0.75 11.3% 9.5% 9.7% 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% -1.0% 0.6% 1.9%
1 10.6% 9.7% 10.1% 0.2% -0.0% 1.0% -0.7% 1.0% 2.2%
2 13.4% 13.1% 12.8% 0.1% 0.1% 2.6% -0.5% 1.3% 2.4%
3 10.3% 9.7% 8.8% 0.0% 0.4% 3.1% -0.2% 1.4% 2.2%
4 10.5% 9.2% 9.4% -0.0% 0.5% 3.3% -0.4% 1.5% 2.7%
5 10.2% 9.7% 10.0% -0.0% 0.5% 3.8% -0.9% 1.1% 2.6%
6 10.2% 8.7% 8.0% -0.1% 0.6% 5.0% -1.3% 0.8% 2.6%
7 12.8% 11.8% 9.5% -0.0% 0.6% 4.6% -1.5% 0.9% 3.0%
8 15.4% 14.0% 11.1% -0.1% 0.8% 6.1% -1.4% 1.6% 3.7%
9 15.7% 13.5% 11.4% -0.2% 0.4% 6.2% -2.6% 0.9% 3.5%
10 17.7% 14.3% 14.3% -0.1% 0.7% 6.1% -2.3% 0.8% 2.8%
15 21.4% 17.1% 16.2% 0.2% 2.9% 10.9% -1.0% 4.0% 5.9%
20 22.3% 17.7% 14.7% -0.0% 1.7% 9.0% -2.1% 3.6% 6.0%
25 34.9% 29.3% 24.2% -1.1% -2.0% 3.4% -6.5% -0.6% 2.8%
30 53.7% 35.2% 36.2% -1.0% -4.2% 9.5% -6.2% -1.4% 4.2%
Table 4: Real exchange rate accounting: overall price level and traded and non-traded good
price differentials vis-a`-vis the overall price level. The real exchange rate accounting
is based on the decomposition 3 in Equation 18, using the food and construction price
data set (see Appendix B.1). Note that the low values of UCM((γ − α)(pTt − pt), qt)
show that, contrary to common belief, traded good price adjustments account for almost
none of the movements of the real exchange rate (the PPP fallacy).
As regards prices, overall inflation, pt, contributes between 9 and 18% to the movements of
the real exchange rate (for horizons of up to twenty years and assuming α = 0.50). Yet the
traded and non-traded good price differentials vis-a`-vis the overall price level, pTt −pt and pNt −pt,
account for almost none of the fluctuations of the real exchange rate. Moreover, the distributions
of UCM(pTt − pt, qt) and UCM(pNt − pt, qt) show very little variation across country pairs, giving
even more credibility to our finding that the traded good and non-traded good excess inflations are
practically irrelevant when it comes to explaining real exchange rate changes.
5.2.3 As much contribution to PPP convergence as to PPP divergence
In theory, it could be the case that traded good price movements contribute to real exchange rate
changes more when the real exchange rate moves towards PPP than when it moves away from PPP.
If this happened to be true, it would indicate that good market arbitrage helps to bring about real
exchange rate convergence. However, as Figure 5 shows, the difference of the unbounded contri-
bution measures, or UCMs, for mean-reverting and mean-diverting real exchange rate changes is
very close to zero, indicating that traded good prices account as much for movements of the real
exchange rate towards PPP as for movements away from PPP.
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(a) Core currency market pressure
(s˜ coret ), α = 0.50
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(b) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign traded good
prices ((γ − α)pTt), α = 0.50
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(c) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign non-traded
good prices (αpNt ), α = 0.50
Figure 5: Directional real exchange rate accounting: core currency market pressure, traded
good prices and nontraded good prices. The real exchange rate accounting is based
on the decomposition 2 in Equation 17, using the food and construction price data set
(see Appendix B.1). Shown is the difference between the contributions of a given
variable to the mean-reverting real exchange rate and its contribution to the
mean-diverting real exchange.
5.3 Robustness of the purchasing power parity fallacy
To check whether our result that good market arbitrage does not contribute to PPP is robust, we
have repeated our calculations with an alternative data set of traded and non-traded good prices.
As before, we find that traded good price changes account for hardly any of the movements of the
real exchange rate. Interestingly, however, we are able to demonstrate that the nominal exchange
rate effect may outweigh the price level effect for certain data sets. The convergence of traded
good prices may therefore even push the real exchange rate away from PPP.
Since it is notoriously difficult to construct accurate indices of traded and non-traded good
prices, the literature has used a variety of proxies. Betts and Kehoe (2006), for instance, recom-
mend using the gross output deflators by sector to construct traded good price measures. However,
as they point out, ”data on [gross output] by sector are only available for a small subset of coun-
tries, and only at the annual frequency”. For our purposes, this is problematic since we need a
relatively large set of countries in order to be able to construct a meaningful distribution of traded
good price contributions to real exchange rate fluctuations. Betts and Kehoe’s ”next conceptually
preferred, and most broadly available, measure of an aggregate traded goods price for a country
is, therefore, its [producer price index (PPI)] for all goods”. Since PPI data is available for a large
number of countries, we decided to check the robustness of the PPP fallacy using the PPI as a
proxy for traded good prices.
Specifically, what we did was to take PPI and CPI as well as nominal exchange rate data from
the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. Since data for all three variables are available for
77 countries, we were able to construct time series of the PPI differential, the CPI differential and
the bilateral real exchange rate for a total of 2,926 country pairs. Denoting the PPI differential as
pTt and the CPI differential as pt, we then computed the non-traded good price differential, p
N
t , as
16
follows:
pt = (1− α)pTt + αpNt ⇔ pNt =
1
α
[pt − (1− α)pTt ] ⇔
α=0.50
pNt = 2pt − pTt . (19)
Our first task was to re-estimate the parameter γ, which measures the proportion of traded
good price changes offset by official intervention. The resulting box plots, which are shown in
Figure 2b, are similar to those of Figure 2a, which plots γ for the food price index. As in the
case of the γ based on food prices, the PPI-based γ falls as the horizon increases, which indicates
that central banks try to offset short-term price-induced exchange rate fluctuations, but not long-
term ones. Nevertheless, the values of γ calculated from the PPI are somewhat lower than those
computed from the food price index; indeed, no matter the horizon considered, the median values
never exceed 0.5. This is as expected, too, since the proportion of traded good price changes offset
by official intervention must be greater for the relatively volatile food price index than for the more
persistent PPI.
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(a) Core currency market pressure
(s˜ coret ), α = 0.50
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(b) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign traded good
prices ((γ − α)pTt), α = 0.50
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(c) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign non-traded
good prices (αpNt ), α = 0.50
Figure 6: Real exchange rate accounting: core currency market pressure, traded good
prices and nontraded good prices. The real exchange rate accounting is based on the
decomposition 2 in Equation 17, using the PPI and CPI data set (see Appendix B.2).
Note that the low values of UCM((γ − α)pTt , qt) show that, contrary to common belief,
traded good price adjustments account for almost none of the movements of the real
exchange rate (the PPP fallacy). Notice also that since γ − α < 0 in general, positive
values of UCM((γ − α)pTt , qt) imply that traded good price convergence contributes to
PPP divergence.
The results of the real exchange rate accounting based on this PPI-based data set are shown in
Figures 6 and 7. For brevity, we only consider a non-traded good share, α, of 0.50 here.
Three things are worth noting. First, both in the case of decomposition 2 in Equation 17 and
of decomposition 3 in Equation 18, real exchange rate fluctuations are mostly accounted for by
changes in core currency market pressure, s˜ coret . Second, the PPI and CPI data show that traded
and non-traded good prices contribute little to real exchange rate movements over time, providing
additional evidence for the PPP fallacy.
Third and most importantly, however, given that, as we have just seen, γ < α in general, the
contribution of traded good prices to real exchange rate changes is of opposite sign of what any
17
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(a) Weighted difference between
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price levels (γpt), α = 0.50
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(b) Weighted difference between
domestic and foreign differences
between traded good prices and
the overall price level
((γ − α)(pTt − pt)), α = 0.50
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(c) Weighted difference of the
domestic and foreign differences
between the non-traded good
prices and the overall price level
(α(pNt − pt)), α = 0.50
Figure 7: Real exchange rate accounting: overall price level and traded and non-traded
good price differentials vis-a`-vis the overall price level. The real exchange rate
accounting is based on the decomposition 3 in Equation 18, using the PPI and CPI data
set (see Appendix B.2). Note that the low values of UCM((γ − α)(pTt − pt), qt) show
that, contrary to common belief, traded good price adjustments account for almost none
of the movements of the real exchange rate (the PPP fallacy). Notice also that since
γ − α < 0 in general, positive values of UCM((γ − α)pTt , qt) imply that traded good
price convergence contributes to PPP divergence.
well-trained economist would expect:
UCM(pTt , qt) =
1
γ − α︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
× UCM((γ − α)pTt , qt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0 (20)
This means that the convergence of traded good prices, when it occurs, leads to a divergence of
the real exchange rate away from PPP, and vice versa. After all, recall from Section 5.1 that
(1 − α) measures the ”price level effect” of traded good prices on the real exchange rate and
−(1 − γ) the ”nominal exchange rate effect”. Therefore, if γ < α, this means that the (negative)
nominal exchange rate effect dominates the (positive) price level effect, implying that good market
arbitrage is actually detrimental to PPP.
5.4 Engel’s (1999) decomposition revisited
Although it is not precisely the topic of this paper, it may be of interest to know what kind of
results the methodology used here (see Section 3) yields when it is applied to the decomposition
of the real exchange rate that Engel (1999) considered in his influential paper (decomposition 4):
qt = x1,t + x2,t, (21)
where
x1,t = q
T
t ,
18
x2,t = α(p
N
t − pTt ).
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(a) Real exchange rate based on
traded good prices (qTt ), α = 0.50
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(b) Weighted difference of the
domestic and foreign differences
between the prices of non-traded
and traded goods (α(pNt − pTt)),
α = 0.50
Figure 8: Real exchange rate accounting: traded good real exchange rate and relative price
of non-traded goods. The real exchange rate accounting is based on the
decomposition 4 in Equation 21, using the food and construction price data set (see
Appendix B.1).
The results are shown in Figure 8. What is striking is that even though we use only two
categories of goods we arrive at the same conclusions as Engel. The traded good real exchange
rate, qTt , accounts for practically all of the changes in the real exchange rate, qt, whereas the ratio
of the domestic and foreign relative prices of non-traded goods accounts for practically none of
the changes. Moreover, the dispersion of the box plots is small, meaning that the finding is robust
across all the country pairs.
Several authors have replicated Engel’s (1999) analysis using different contribution measures
(see Appendix A.1) or data sets. Betts and Kehoe (2006, 2008) confirm by and large the finding
whereby the relative price of non-traded to traded goods accounts for almost none of the move-
ments of the real exchange rate. They point out, however, that the empirical results depend on
the price series used and on the choice of trade partners. Bache et al. (2013) suggest that the
violation of the law of one price for traded goods may be less due to movements in the relative
price of traded goods at the dock, but rather to movements in the relative distribution wedge. In
a similar spirit, Burstein et al. (2006) claim that the relative price of non-traded goods accounts
for roughly half of the cyclical movements in the real exchange rate (however, as is explained in
Section A.1.2, their accounting methodology differs from that of Engel, 1999). Finally, Chen et al.
(2006) look at real exchange rates between regions of the United States (where the nominal ex-
change rate is fixed) and find that the relative price of non-traded goods can explain up to 80% of
real exchange rate changes over medium and long horizons (assuming a share of non-traded goods
of 0.51). Their work was inspired by Mendoza (2000) who had reported comparable results for
the real exchange rate between Mexico and the United States during periods of fixed or managed
exchange rates.
19
As we show in Appendix A.1.1, the contribution measures used by Engel (1999), CMMSE(1)
and CMMSE(2), can only be used to decompose the real exchange rate into two components, not
more. However, a question that Engel’s research raises is for how much of the changes of the real
exchange rate the domestic and foreign relative prices of non-traded goods by themselves, rather
than their ratio, account. For it could be the case that the relative prices of non-traded goods at
home and abroad are actually quite variable and that it is only their ratio that turns out to hardly
matter at all. However, this question is easily answered using the unbounded contribution measure,
UCM, since this measure can be applied to any number of components of a composite variable.
The decomposition we are interested in is thus the following (decomposition 5):
qt = x1,t + x2,t + x3,t, (22)
where
x1,t = q
T
t ,
x2,t = α(p
N,H
t − pT,Ht ),
x3,t = −α(pN,Ft − pT,Ft ).
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(−α(pNFt − pTFt )), α = 0.50
Figure 9: Real exchange rate accounting: domestic and foreign relative prices of non-traded
goods. The real exchange rate accounting is based on the decomposition 5 in
Equation 22, using the food and construction price data set (see Appendix B.1).
The results are of decomposition 5 are shown in Figure 9. What we find is that it is not just the
ratio of the relative prices of non-traded goods at home and abroad that accounts for practically
none of the real exchange changes, but the relative prices themselves. Indeed, the variation of
UCM(α(pN,Ht −pT,Ht ), qt) and UCM(−α(pN,Ft −pT,Ft ), qt) across country pairs is even smaller than
the already small variation of UCM(α(pNt − pTt ), qt) in Panel b of Figure 8.
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5.5 The law of one price for traded goods
5.5.1 Contribution of traded good prices to traded good real exchange rate changes
Engel’s (1999) work suggests that real exchange rate changes are primarily accounted for by de-
viations of the law of one price for traded goods or, what is the same, to deviations of the traded
good real exchange rate, qTt , from zero. In this section, we turn to the traded good real exchange
rate and ask to what extent it itself is driven by traded good prices. Our interest is to find out
whether good market arbitrage is conducive to restoring if not purchasing power parity (qt = 0),
then at least the law of one price for traded goods (qTt = 0).
Since the traded good real exchange rate, which is defined as qTt = st+p
T
t , is equal to currency
market pressure, s˜t, we decompose it as follows (decomposition 6):
qTt = x1,t + x2,t, (23)
where
x1,t = s˜
core
t ,
x2,t = s˜
inflation-offsetting
t = γp
T
t .
Note that traded good prices affect the traded good real exchange rate only through inflation-
offsetting currency market pressure.
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(b) Inflation-offsetting currency
market pressure
(s˜ inflation-offsettingt = γp
T
t),
α = 0.50
Figure 10: Traded good real exchange rate accounting: core currency market pressure and
inflation-offsetting currency market pressure. The traded good real exchange rate
accounting is based on the decomposition 6 in Equation 23, using the food and
construction price data set (see Appendix B.1).
The box plots for the contributions of core currency market pressure and inflation-offsetting
currency market pressure to changes in the traded good real exchange rate are shown in Figure 10.
We see that at horizons of up to ten years, core currency market pressure accounts for as much as
79 to 88% of the movements of the traded good real exchange rate, whereas traded good prices
account for as little as 12 to 21%. This finding offers a very straightforward explanation of why
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deviations of the traded good real exchange rate from the law of one price do not damp out more
quickly. For although traded good price movements affect the traded good real exchange rate, this
effect is dwarfed by the much stronger impact of core currency market pressure. As we will show
in Section 6, core currency market pressure is heavily driven by balance of payments flows, whose
movements are known to be large and highly persistent.
5.5.2 More contribution to PPP convergence than to PPP divergence
To gauge the extent to which traded good arbitrage helps to equalize traded good prices across
countries, we ask a question similar to that posed in Section 5.2.3, namely: Do traded good price
movements contribute more to mean-reverting changes in qTt than to mean-diverting ones? We
take an affirmative answer to this question as evidence of the effectiveness of the law of one price
for traded goods.
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Figure 11: Directional traded good real exchange rate accounting: core currency market
pressure and inflation-offsetting currency market pressure. The traded good real
exchange rate accounting is based on the decomposition 6 in Equation 23, using the
food and construction price data set (see Appendix B.1). Shown is the difference
between the contributions of a given variable to the mean-reverting traded good real
exchange rate and its contribution to the mean-diverting traded good real exchange.
The results are shown in Panel b of Figure 11. We find that the difference between
UCM(γpTt , q
T
t ) when q
T
t is mean-reverting and UCM(γp
T
t , q
T
t ) when q
T
t is mean-diverting is zero
on average for most horizons, yet that it is markedly positive for short horizons. For example, the
median difference is 8%, 6%, 4% and 3% at horizons of one, two, three and four quarters, respect-
ively, and it is close to zero only at horizons of more than a year. We interpret this as evidence that
traded good prices are partly driven by arbitrage in traded goods and that exchange rates are kept
sufficiently stable at short horizons for good market arbitrage to have an effect on the traded good
real exchange rate. On the other hand, Panel a of Figure 11 indicates that short-term movements
away from traded good purchasing power parity are caused primarily by the fluctuations of the
core currency market pressure variable.
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6 Economic interpretation of currency market pressure
Currency market pressure is defined in this paper as the deviation of the nominal exchange rate
from its PPP-consistent value (based on the traded good real exchange rate, see Equation 11).
The economic determinants of currency market pressure depend on the model one uses to ex-
plain the nominal exchange rate. Here we use an extended version of the model developed in
the Supplementary Appendix of Mu¨ller-Plantenberg (2017b) to derive what we consider to be the
main driving forces of currency market pressure (see also Brooks, Edison, Kumar and Sløk, 2001,
Mu¨ller-Plantenberg, 2006, 2010, 2017a, Combes, Kinda and Plane, 2012, Gabaix and Maggiori,
2015).
Suppose there are two economic agents, a domestic one and a foreign one. Assume the do-
mestic agent sells goods or financial assets to the foreign agent. In the first case there would be
a current account surplus, in the second case a ”capital inflow”. In both cases, the foreign agent
would have to pay money to the domestic agent. To understand how this payment affects currency
market pressure, s˜t, and the exchange rate, st, we now consider the optimization problems faced
by both agents.
To start with, let us introduce the necessary notation. The domestic agent’s holdings of the
foreign currency are denoted as mH:FCt and the foreign agent’s holdings of domestic currency as
mF:HCt . The values of both currency holdings may be measured in terms of a world currency, so
as to make them comparable. Furthermore, the difference between both currency holdings shall
be represented by the variable m˜HFt ; that is, m˜
HF
t = m
H:FC
t −mF:HCt . Finally, let ∆mt denote the
amount of foreign currency the domestic agent exchanges for domestic currency with the foreign
agent.
Furthermore, we letRHl,t andR
F
l,t denote the cumulative nominal interest rates on, respectively,
domestic and foreign monetary assets between t and t + l and rHl,t and r
F
l,t the corresponding real
interest rates (based on traded good inflation). To abbreviate the notation for the international
interest differentials, we let Rl,t = RHl,t −RFl,t and rl,t = rHl,t − rFl,t (just as pTt = pT,Ht − pT,Ft ).
Now let us return to our economic example. If the balance of payments transaction mentioned
above is denominated in the foreign currency, the domestic agent would have to go long in the
foreign currency; in other words, mH:FCt would rise. It is reasonable to assume that, to start with,
the domestic agent would want to avoid any open position in the foreign currency, be it long or
short, since she or he will not be able to know whether the foreign currency will appreciate or
depreciate in the future. However, the domestic agent will be willing to go long in the foreign
currency if she or he expects that the foreign currency will buy more goods in the future than an
equivalent amount of the domestic currency.
Let t + l denote the period in which the domestic agent expects to use her or his foreign
currency holdings to buy traded goods. Then the domestic agent faces the following optimization
problem:
min
st
1
2
{[(
RFl,t − pT,Ft+l
)− (−st +RHl,t − pT,Ht+l)]− 2ξ (mH:FCt −∆mt)}2 , (24)
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where ξ is a positive parameter. Note that RFl,t − pT,Ft+l is the purchasing power of one unit of
the foreign currency that is saved for l periods and then spent on foreign traded goods and that
−st + RHl,t − pT,Ht+l is the purchasing power of an equivalent amount of the domestic currency that
is saved for l periods and then spent on domestic traded goods.
If, on the other hand, the balance of payments transaction is denominated in the domestic
currency, the foreign agent would have to go short in the domestic currency; in other words, mF:HCt
would fall. Similar reasoning to that above leads to the following optimization problem for the
foreign agent:
min
st
1
2
{[(
RHl,t − pT,Ht+l
)− (st +RFl,t − pT,Ft+l)]− 2ξ (mF:HCt −∆mt)}2 . (25)
The first-order conditions for the optimization problems in equations 24 and 25 yield a system
of two linear equations with two unknowns, st and ∆mt. The solution is as follows:
∆mt =
1
2
(mH:FCt +m
F:HC
t ) , (26)
st = Rl,t − pTt+l + ξm˜HFt
= −pTt +Rl,t −
(
pTt+l − pTt
)
+ ξm˜HFt
= s anchort + rl,t + ξm˜
HF
t ,
(27)
Note that at the optimum the domestic and foreign agents exchange their currencies in the amount
required to ensure that the same nominal exchange rate is optimal for both of them.
A comparison of Equation 11 with Equation 27 shows us that currency market pressure, s˜t, is
determined by the real interest differential, rl,t, and the gap between the foreign currency holdings
of the domestic agent and the domestic currency holdings of the foreign agent, m˜HFt :
s˜t = rl,t + ξm˜
HF
t . (28)
Note that the variable m˜HFt is a stock that, as we have suggested in our example, is linked to the
past and present balance of payments flows between the home country and the foreign country. To
be more specific, let zHFt be the cumulative current account, or international investment position,
eHFt be the difference between the domestic agent’s holdings of foreign equity and the foreign
agent’s holdings of domestic equity, bHFt be the difference between the domestic agent’s holdings
of foreign bonds and the foreign agent’s holdings of domestic bonds and bH¯F¯t be the difference
between the domestic central bank’s holdings of foreign bonds and the foreign central bank’s
holdings of domestic bonds. Then the stock version of the balance of payments identity implies
the following relationship between those variables:
m˜HFt = z
HF
t − eHFt − bHFt − bH¯F¯t . (29)
Equations 27 and 29 capture most of the nominal exchange rate determinants that are gen-
erally considered to be empirically relevant. The flow versions of both equations tell us that the
net appreciation of the domestic currency against the foreign currency is the stronger: the lower
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domestic inflation is and the higher foreign inflation is, the more the real interest differential rises,
the higher the current account balance is, the higher net FDI and equity investment inflows into the
home country are, the higher net lending inflows (bonds, loans, trade credits etc.) into the home
country are and the more official reserves the domestic central bank is selling and the foreign cent-
ral bank is buying. The inflation differential itself depends, of course, on other variables such as
money supply growth and output growth at home and abroad.
7 Conclusions
In the minds of many international economists, certain beliefs regarding the real exchange rate
seem to be unshakable. First, deviations from purchasing power parity must be temporary. Second,
traded good prices can only differ across countries inasmuch as transport costs hinder arbitrage.
Third, movements of the real exchange rate outside the no-arbitrage bands or indeed persistent
deviations from absolute PPP (qt = 0) must be due to international differences in the relative
prices of non-traded goods. And fourth, the slow mean reversion of the real exchange rate is
probably due either to the fact that we mix up movements outside the no-arbitrage bands (where
mean reversion is fast) and inside the no-arbitrage bands (where there is no reason to expect any
mean reversion) or to the fact that it is difficult to distinguish well traded goods (for which arbitrage
is possible) and non-traded goods (for which arbitrage is not possible).
This paper challenges all of the aforementioned beliefs. First, the idea that the law of one price
implies that the real exchange rate, defined as qt = st + pHt − pFt , is always brought back to zero
through traded good arbitrage is questionable. For the nominal exchange rate, st, depends itself
negatively on domestic traded good prices and positively on foreign traded good prices, with the
consequence that the real exchange rate is pretty much unaffected by the movements of traded
good prices at home and abroad (what is more, depending on the data set used, good market
arbitrage may even be detrimental to PPP). This is what we call the purchasing power parity
fallacy. Instead, this paper shows that the main driving force behind the real exchange rate is core
currency market pressure, a variable that is linked to economic variables such as real interest rates
and balance of payments flows.
Second, the fact that traded good prices differ across countries, or that the traded good real
exchange rate is different from zero, is hardly surprising. After all, we find that core currency
market pressure, which is unrelated to traded good prices, accounts for as much as 79 to 88%
of traded good real exchange rate movements (for horizons of up to ten years) and inflation-
offsetting currency market pressure, which is linked to traded good inflation, for the rest. If traded
good prices affect the traded good real exchange rate so little, it should seem that differences in
international traded good prices can persist independently of whether they exceed transport costs
or not. The comforting news is that at short horizons traded good prices appear to contribute
somewhat more to traded good real exchange rate movements towards the mean than away from
it, suggesting that the law of one price may work at least partially for traded goods.
Now consider the third point. Our paper confirms the finding of several recent studies that the
relative price of non-traded goods hardly contributes to real exchange rate movements. However,
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here we calculate the contribution of non-traded good prices to real exchange rate movements
using exact contribution measures. In Appendix A, these measures are shown to potentially deviate
from the contribution measures used in the literature. Another advantage of the present work is
that it considers far more country pairs. Last but not least, by using price data of single categories
of traded and non-traded goods, the calculations carried out here avoid as much as possible the use
of price data for categories that include both traded and non-traded goods.
Finally, by suggesting that real exchange rate movements are primarily accounted for by
changes in core currency market pressure, this paper calls for a very different approach to what
has become known as the purchasing power parity puzzle. Rogoff (1996) summarizes the PPP
puzzle as follows:
”How can one reconcile the enormous short-term volatility of real exchange rates
with the extremely slow rate at which shocks appear to damp out? [...] Consensus
estimates for the rate at which PPP deviations damp [...] suggest a half-life of three to
five years, seemingly far too long to be explained by nominal rigidities.”
As is shown here, currency market pressure is heavily driven by currency flows that arise when dif-
ferences between current account balances and net capital outflows produce balance of payments
imbalances. There is every reason to believe that these currency flows are very volatile. Indeed,
there is strong empirical evidence that short-term capital flows, which tend to vary strongly over
time, have significant effects on exchange rates. At the same time, it is no secret that cumulative
balance of payments imbalances, particularly as a result of lasting current account surpluses or
deficits, can be very persistent in the medium and long term. This suggests that movements in
currency market pressure must be persistent, too, and thus provides a very simple and intuitive ex-
planation of the slow decay of real exchange rate deviations from PPP. Put differently, the question
of whether traded or non-traded good prices are sticky or not does not pose itself.
Appendix A The unbounded and bounded contribution measures
versus alternative contribution measures
In this appendix, the performance of the UCM and the BCM is compared to that of various contri-
bution measures proposed in the literature. We start by introducing those alternative contribution
measures in Appendix A.1. The comparison is then carried out in Appendix A.2 using a Monte
Carlo approach.
A.1 Alternative contribution measures
A.1.1 Engel’s (1999) contribution measures
Engel (1999) uses contribution measures that build on the mean squared error criterion (MSE).
Although the mean squared error is a concept used in statistics to quantify the difference between
values implied by an estimator and the true values of the quantity being estimated, we follow Engel
and adopt this concept analogously in the context of exchange rate accounting. Suppose that xt is
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the sum of only two components, x1,t and x2,t, so that xt = x1,t + x2,t. From the definition of the
mean squared error, we can deduce the following:
MSE(∆hxt) = MSE(∆hx1,t + ∆hx2,t)
= Var(∆hx1,t + ∆hx2,t) + [Bias(∆hx1,t + ∆hx2,t)]
2
= Var(∆hx1,t) + Var(∆hx2,t) + 2 Cov(∆hx1,t,∆hx2,t)
+ [Bias(∆hx1,t)]
2 + [Bias(∆hx2,t)]
2 + 2 Bias(∆hx1,t) Bias(∆hx2,t)
= MSE(∆hx1,t) + MSE(∆hx2,t) + 2 Bias(∆hx1,t) Bias(∆hx2,t)
+ 2 Cov(∆hx1,t,∆hx2,t).
(30)
The mean squared error of the composite series ∆hxt is thus equal to the sum of the mean squared
errors of its two components, ∆hx1,t and ∆hx2,t, plus an additional term involving the product of
the ”biases” and the covariance of both components.
It is natural to use the mean squared errors of both components to measure their respective
contribution to the mean squared error of the composite series. However, it is less clear what
should be done with the additional term. Two possibilities that suggest themselves are to either
ignore this term or to attribute it equally to both component series. Engel applies both alternatives
and finds that they lead to similar results in his context. Specifically, the two contribution measures
he considers are the following:
CMMSE(1)(xi,t, xt) =
MSE(∆hx1,t)
MSE(∆hx1,t) + MSE(∆hx2,t)
, (31)
CMMSE(2)(xi,t, xt)
=
MSE(∆hx1,t) + Bias(∆hx1,t) Bias(∆hx2,t) + Cov(∆hx1,t,∆hx2,t)
MSE(∆hxt)
. (32)
Note that the ”bias” is measured around zero and is thus equal to the arithmetic mean of the
variable in question. For the variance, Engel uses a small-sample correction:
Bias(∆hx·,t) =
h
T − 1(x·,T − x·,1), (33)
Var(∆hx·,t) =
T
(T − h− 1)(T − h)
T∑
t=h+1
[∆hx·,t − Bias(∆hx·,t)]2. (34)
A.1.2 Other contribution measures
One contribution measure used in the literature is based on sample variances:
CMVar(1)(x1,t, xt) =
Var(∆hx1,t)
Var(∆hx1,t) + Var(∆hx2,t)
. (35)
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Similar to the contribution measure CMMSE(1), the measure CMVar(1) can only take values
between zero and one.
An alternative measure is also based on variances, but takes the correlation between ∆hx1,t
and ∆hx2,t into account:
CMVar(2)(x1,t, xt) =
Var(∆hx1,t) + Cov(∆hx1,t,∆hx2,t)
Var(∆hxt)
=
Var(∆hx1,t) + Cov(∆hx1,t,∆hx2,t)
Var(∆hx1,t) + Var(∆hx2,t) + 2 Cov(∆hx1,t,∆hx2,t)
.
(36)
Yet another contribution measure proposed in the literature is based on the sample standard
deviations:
CMStd(x1,t, xt) =
Std(∆hx1,t)
Std(∆hxt)
. (37)
Finally, authors have looked at the sample correlation between the component series and the
composite series:
CMCorr(x1,t, xt) =
Cov(∆hx1,t,∆hxt)
Std(∆hx1,t) Std(∆hxt)
. (38)
Note that −1 < CMCorr < 1. There is no obvious relationship with the UCM.
The contribution measures CMVar(1), CMVar(2), CMStd and CMCorr have been proposed by
Betts and Kehoe (2006, 2008). These authors apply those measures to the levels of the real ex-
change rate and its components and to the linearly detrended levels. They further use the measures
CMMSE(1), CMStd and CMCorr for the one-year and four-year differences of the real exchange
rate and its components. Burstein et al. (2006) adopt CMVar(2) with a slight modification: by
attributing the covariance term of the variance of the composite series, 2 Cov(x1, x2), either fully
to one component series or to the other one, they obtain lower and upper bounds for the contri-
bution of the component series to the composite series. Moreover, Burstein et al. actually do not
apply CMVar(2) to the differences of the series but to their levels, where the levels have previously
been detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Drozd and
Nosal (2010) use the measures CMStd and CMCorr, Bache et al. (2013) the measure CMVar(1).
However, Chen et al. (2006) use Engel’s (1999) original measures, CMMSE(1) and CMMSE(2).
A.2 Comparison of contribution measures
In order to compare the properties of the UCM and the BCM with those of the contribution meas-
ures used in the literature, we rely on Monte Carlo simulations. We look at three different models,
in all of which x1,t and x2,t are modelled as random walks:
xi,t = xi,t−1 + ∆xi,t, for i = 1, 2, (39)
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where t = 2, 3, . . . , T , T = 100 and xi,1 = 0. The stochastic processes in models 1 to 3
differ only with respect to their innovations, ∆hx1,t and ∆hx2,t, as will be shown below. We
also experimented with stochastic processes with some kind of mean reversion or error correction
mechanism, but the results we obtained were similar; this is why we only report the results for the
random walk processes which are easier to interpret. The sample size of the Monte Carlo runs is
1000 in each case. The results are shown in Table 5. Differences refer to first-order differences
(h = 1).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Median Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Mean SD
Differences
UCM −0.994 −1.004 0.143 0.510 0.511 0.119 0.278 0.281 0.065
BCM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.396 0.396 0.043 0.311 0.314 0.059
CMMSE(1) 0.248 0.248 0.028 0.385 0.384 0.033 0.075 0.084 0.045
CMMSE(2) −0.504 −0.513 0.099 0.203 0.207 0.074 0.074 0.082 0.050
CMVar(1) 0.248 0.248 0.028 0.240 0.240 0.000 0.074 0.084 0.045
CMVar(2) −0.505 −0.513 0.100 −1.282 −1.282 0.000 0.074 0.082 0.050
CMStd 0.996 1.008 0.151 1.282 1.282 0.000 0.274 0.280 0.075
CMCorr −0.509 −0.509 0.058 −1.000 −1.000 0.000 0.275 0.276 0.117
Levels
CMMSE(1) 0.239 0.270 0.153 0.951 0.915 0.094 0.068 0.137 0.165
CMMSE(2) −0.478 −0.487 0.762 0.832 0.842 0.151 0.059 0.071 0.276
CMVar(1) 0.245 0.259 0.111 0.937 0.902 0.095 0.070 0.115 0.121
CMVar(2) −0.494 −0.482 0.518 0.824 0.835 0.148 0.063 0.080 0.175
CMStd 0.977 1.076 0.521 0.835 0.844 0.150 0.267 0.319 0.202
CMCorr −0.555 −0.452 0.408 0.991 0.989 0.006 0.286 0.230 0.475
Table 5: Comparison of contribution measures. Comparison of the UCM and BCM with the
contribution measures used in the literature. In the case of differences, the contribution
of ∆x1,t to ∆xt is measured. In the case of levels, the contribution of x1,t to xt is
measured.
A.2.1 Model 1
Model 1 takes the following form:
∆x1,t = −ut × εt, (40)
∆x2,t = εt, (41)
where ut ∼ U(0, 1) and εt ∼ N(0, 1). Note that in this model, it will always be the case that
∆x1,t/∆xt < 0, so that necessarily UCM < 0 and BCM = 0. In fact, since ∆x1,t = −ut × εt,
∆xt = (1 − ut) × εt and E(ut) = E(1 − ut) = 12 , the UCM should take on a value near minus
one in the simulated sample:
lim
T→∞
UCM(x1,t, xt) = lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
|(1− ut)εt|∑T
τ=1 |(1− uτ )ετ |
× −utεt
(1− ut)εt
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= lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
−ut|εt|∑T
τ=1(1− uτ )|ετ |
= lim
T→∞
−12
∑T
t=1 |εt|
1
2
∑T
t=1 |εt|
= −1. (42)
Turning now to the contribution measures used in the literature, it is easy to see that the stand-
ard deviation of the component series ∆x1,t is equal in expectation to that of the composite series
∆xt. This implies that CMStd should be positive and near one in the simulated sample, no matter
whether we look at the series in differences or in levels, even though x1,t clearly does not contrib-
ute at all to the movements of xt. Therefore, CMStd is not useful as a measure of co-movement
between the component and composite series.
Another insight to take away from model 1 is that the contribution measures CMMSE(1) and
CMVar(1) ignore the negative correlation between ∆x1,t and ∆xt and between x1,t and xt and thus
take on positive values, whereas the UCM and the BCM suggest that they should be negative or
zero. Both CMMSE(1) and CMVar(1) thus appear inadequate as contribution measures, too. While
the measures CMMSE(2) and CMVar(2) do take on negative values in this model, the values lie
somewhere between the UCM and the BCM and are arguably more difficult to interpret than the
latter.
A.2.2 Model 2
Model 2 takes the following form:
∆x1,t = µ1 + εt, (43)
∆x2,t = µ2 − θεt, (44)
where µ1 = 1, µ2 = 0.2, θ = 1.78 and εt ∼ N(0, 1). The parameter θ is chosen so that the
UCM is about one half (with the BCM near 0.4). However, note that the correlation between the
differences of the component series and the composite series is perfectly negative, whereas the
correlation between the corresponding levels is almost perfectly positive. This demonstrates that
CMCorr, whether measured for differences or levels, is a misleading measure of the contribution
of x1,t and x2,t to the movements of xt.
As mentioned, the contribution of x1,t to the movements of xt is roughly one half on average.
The contribution measure that comes closest to this value is CMMSE(1) when applied to differ-
ences; it takes a value 0.382, or about 76% of the UCM. However, this measure did badly in
model 1, where it took a positive sign, rather than a negative one as the UCM. The values of the
measures CMMSE(2) and CMVar(1) for differences are unreasonably low (around 0.2), whereas
those of the measures CMMSE(1), CMMSE(2), CMVar(1) and CMVar(2) for levels are all too high
(around 0.8–0.9). Due to the negative correlation between ∆x1,t and ∆x2,t, the measure CMVar(2)
takes on a negative value when applied to the differences:
CMVar(2)(x1,t, xt) = (1− 1.78)/(1 + 1.782 − 2× 1.78) = −1.282. (45)
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This example shows why it is problematic to use a contribution measure that ignores the drifts of
x1,t and x2,t if they exist.
A.2.3 Model 3
Model 3 takes the following form:
∆x1,t = ε1,t, (46)
∆x2,t = ε
3
2,t, (47)
where ε1,t ∼ N(0, 1), ε2,t ∼ N(0, 1) and ε1,t and ε2,t are drawn independently. This example
demonstrates that if x1,t and x2,t are driven by shocks from different distributions, CMMSE(1),
CMMSE(2), CMVar(1) and CMVar(2) can all be significantly biased compared to the UCM and the
BCM. The only measures that come close to the UCM and the BCM in this particular example are
CMStd and CMCorr. However, those latter measures proved clearly inadequate in the other two
experiments.
A.2.4 Conclusions from the comparison of contribution measures
When a variable is the exact sum of other variables, the contribution of the latter variables to the
composite series can be calculated precisely using the UCM and the BCM. These two contribution
measures are simple and intuitive. As the Monte Carlo simulations have shown, all the measures
proposed in the literature deviate from the UCM and the BCM for even quite simple stochastic
processes. In many cases, they have the wrong sign or are significantly biased. Even if those
measures do well in one model, they do badly in others. Our impression is that for very simple
models, the measure CMMSE(2) based on differences is the one that comes closest to the UCM.
However, as the models 1 to 3 show, CMMSE(2) can also be quite off the target.
Appendix B Data
B.1 Food and construction price data set
The food and construction price data set used in this paper has already been described at the
beginning of Section 4. Here we add information on the country coverage and length of the time
series data that we took from the Main Economic Indicators of the OECD. The data set covers the
following countries:
Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
The available series vary in length, with the longest price and nominal exchange rate series span-
ning the period from 1960Q1 to 2017Q2. Note that with 16 countries, we can compute nominal
and real exchange rates as well as price differentials for a total of 120 country pairs (= (16 × 15) /
2).
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We thought that the fact that some country pairs had fixed bilateral exchange rates during parts
of the sample could be of relevance, yet found that taking out those pairs hardly affected our results
and hence left them in. It should be noted that using data on countries that temporarily fix their
exchange rates vis-a`-vis other countries will overstate the effect of traded good prices on the real
exchange rate as the nominal exchange rate effect is reduced. This adds, of course, confidence to
our finding that traded good prices account for almost none of the movements of real exchange
rates. However, as already said, our results were practically identical for the full sample and the
sub-sample.
B.2 PPI and CPI data set
The PPI and CPI data set that we use for our robustness analysis in section 5.3 was taken from
the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. In this database, nominal exchange rate as well
as PPI and CPI data are available for the following set of countries:
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of the Congo, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia.
The available series vary in length, with the longest price and nominal exchange rate series span-
ning the period from 1957Q1 to 2016Q2. Note that with 77 countries, we can compute nominal
and real exchange rates as well as price differentials for a total of 2,926 country pairs (= (77× 76)
/ 2).
Appendix C Determining inflation-offsetting currency market pres-
sure
In this paper, inflation-offsetting currency market pressure, s˜ inflation-offsettingt , is defined as γp
T
t ,
where γ is chosen such that UCM(pTt , s˜
core
t ) = 0. Denoting UCM(p
T
t , s˜
core
t ) as Φ(γ), we see that:
Φ(γ) = UCM(pTt , s˜
core
t )
= UCM(pTt , s˜t − γpTt )
=
T∑
t=h+1
|∆hs˜t − γ∆hpTt |∑T
τ=h+1 |∆hs˜τ − γ∆hpTτ |
× ∆hp
T
t
∆hs˜t − γ∆hpTt
(48)
= Φ1(γ)× Φ2(γ),
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where
Φ1(γ) =
1∑T
τ=h+1 |∆hs˜τ − γ∆hpTτ |
,
Φ2(γ) =
T∑
t=h+1
sgn(∆hs˜t − γ∆hpTt )×∆hpTt .
(49)
It is easily verified that Φ2(γ) is weakly decreasing in γ, that Φ2(γ) → Φ¯2 > 0 as γ → −∞
and that Φ2(γ) → Φ¯ 2 < 0 as γ → +∞. Hence there exists exactly one interval of values of γ
for which Φ2(γ) = 0. Since Φ1(γ) > 0 always (unless ∆hs˜t = γ∆hpTt for all t), it follows that
Φ(γ) = 0 for the same interval of values of γ for which Φ2(γ) = 0. Computationally, this interval
can be estimated using a grid search with an arbitrarily fine, possibly adaptive grid. As for the
value of γ, we used the midpoint of the estimated interval. It should be noted, however, that the
estimated interval is of zero length most of the time so that a point estimate can be used for γ.
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